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THE MORAL LORE OF FOLKLORE 
Henry Glassie 
Fruitful ar~lbiguities in the title of this 
series, Future of American F'olklore , I  allow me to 
air concerns about che present state of our disci- 
pline and to address the future with hope. 
Hope seems an odd, anachronistic word to use 
rroday. Hard times, we are told, grip us. These are 
aays for restraint, retrenching, and complaint. 
Yet this is a time of unbelievable prosperity. 
2iles of money rise on the horizon, lifiiiting our 
vision, causing us to curl back on ourselves, 
shriveling into inaction. It is not difficult to 
understand how the rhetoric of hard times works. 
When those who have no real problerils grouse about 
what a tough situation they are in, then they can- 
not oe asked to share, they cannot be asked to help 
inose whose problems are real. They can keep their 
wealtn co themselves. Tne pr~blein we do have is 
thac we let tne genuine economic worries of others 
Decome our own unfounded economic worries, and then 
we perinit economic worries to spill over into the 
rest of our lives, inspiring us to act conserva- 
tively and timldly, even in our scholarship. De- 
spite cne hardships of many of the people we must 
champion, these are boom times for our discipline. 
It should be a time for brave,critical scholarship. 
Despite the times and the multitudinous signs of 
academic cowardice around me, I am optimistic and 
I wish to appraise our condition and then consider 
our future in a hopeful mood. 
My appraisal will be no jeremiad. Yet when 
I focus my thoughts on folklore's future, I find 
n~yself prodded and guided by a jeremiad, by a rich 
ana angry critique recently articulated by a noble 
historian, Lee Benson, directed at his own disci- 
pline but extended by hirn to all of the social 
sciences and so, by implication, to folklore? 
Benson's clean attack upon history provides me with 
a way to begin my consideration of folklore. Loose- 
ly, and at a respecrrful distance, I will follow 
Lee Benson to explain why I am optimistic about 
folklore, to tell you why the meek will inherit 
;ne acaaemy. 
There was a time--to relay Benson's tale sim- 
ply--when historians were both scientists and moral 
philosopners. Ihis golden age does not lie in some 
dim time out of mind. Less than a century ago his- 
corians were driven by both scientific and moral 
mocives . 
To define moral philosophyj Lee Benson returns 
ro Karl Marx. 'uJhile I lean in Benson's direction 
politically, u~y ideological heritage is more 
English chan continental. I would isolate a aiffer- 
ent source, name different heroes. Still, as a 
folalorist I am perfectly comfortable with the es- 
sence of Benson's definition of moral philosophy 
as an argument over selfhood and responsibility. 
H moral scho~arsnip, I agree, should provide people 
witn ways to gain consciousness and ways for them 
to unaerstand their role within the larger needs 
of sqcjecy. 
'The historians toward whom Lee Benson reori- 
ents us were moral philosophers and they were sci- 
entiscs. As scientists they engaged with reality 
Ln such a way tnat engagement led to intellectual 
progress. 
lhe nistory of history, in Benson's retelling, 
is not complex. Slowly at firsc, then rapialy after 
the First dorla war, historians abandoned moral 
philosopay and Decame engrossed in the scientific 
diillensions of their enterprise. As history broke 
loose £rotL. ics moral foundations, its science per- 
111uced inco mere professionalism. The way to promo- 
tion ana pay became the performance of tight, sol- 
id, petcy exercises. tiistorians prospered; History 
decayed. The purpose of history--the demand written 
inco ics pedagogic function--is to address through 
faccs froill tne past the issues of selfhood and re- 
sonsibility. But that purpose withered and lay for- 
gotten as nistorians got better and better at their 
jobs, as they employed more rigorous technologies 
anu appliea Enem to increasingly insignificant 
Logics. 
Conslaer our aiscipline, folklore, in =he 
rraille I borrow from Lee Benson. Science first. If 
sclence is a maccer of engaging with reality so 
ds to creace progress, then foltclo~ists can claim-- 
in <he triost irnportanc aspect of our task--steacy 
progress. Uur greatest responsibility, finally, 
is preserving fol~lore. Prom the days when scholars 
n i i d L 2  down wnat tney remembered, co the days when 
,exes were tatcen fro111 dictacion, to the days of 
aacc mechanical recording, to the very present 
wden ethnopoecic modes of transcription claim our 
attention and improve our texts--3 throughout our 
nLstory it is easy to trace steady advancement in 
recording reality. That is progress, scientific 
progress, but if we continue to attend to Benson, 
de will feel tnat in another realm of the science 
of folklore, our progress has been matched by 
regress. 
Like other social scientists, folklorists have 
worked to improve their practice by borrowing ideas 
from the natural sciences. Our modes of observa- 
tion and recording have probably been refined by 
our notion of the ways that scientists proceed. 
But When we built borrowed ideas into structures 
of explanation, our borrowings were inappropriate 
and foolish. One cannot explain people in the way 
that one explains stars or onions or wolves. 
Volition is inalienably essential to human being 
(as anyone who has spent a serious hour w i c h  a new 
baby knows). We can observe people as ~ ~ ~ o u g h  they 
were nacural phenomena, b u ~  any explana~ion that 
does not accounc fully and richly for hlll~lan will 
si~nply lnisses the point. The scientific explanation 
of behavioral surfaces looks orderly. ;inally it 
is hollow, worthless. 
In folklore, a mad scientist's vision of 
science came to prevail. Instead of doing as scien- 
tisrs dla, ii~atcning data to appropriate methods 
and theories, we parodied science and became ob- 
sessea with something we nideously cern~ed method- 
ology. iv~etnods are means, but they became for us 
ends. It oecame enougn for us to ao little jobs 
efficien~ly. Though we spoke tne word "theory," 
Me scrove to transform theories into methods that 
would eriably us to do those little jobs. Take this 
simple instance from our history. Context was a 
Key word in the late sixties. Bent upon method, 
unrilinctful of theory, we distorcea contexts into 
objects to record carefully, thus avoiding the ex- 
glanatory force of the idea. Context is a theory 
of textual rneaning.4 Yet we made text and context 
into an opposition, and then we strangely recom- 
posed contexts into texts, complex sensate items 
to recoru, when context is thac whicn is invisibly 
woven inco texts, into songs or singing events, 
inco houses or whole landscapes, to make them mean- 
ingful. Concext is one way to approach human 
~i~ocivation, to get at purpose, at creativity and 
~~ieaning. The idea is lost when a context becomes 
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DUE a big cext to record. We turned away from 
,heoretical context to concentrate on methodolo- 
gical contexc and we left texts without meaning, 
artists wichouc will. 
We surrendered explanation to description, 
ineory to method. We lost our purpose while be- 
coming professsional, and we began to do those 
Litcle exercises tor which Lee Benson chides his 
colleagues. As tne pay check swells, one gets more 
~nvolvea In facile, easily accomplished tasks; one 
gets beccer and better at doing them, at defending 
their results, and pretty soon we are doing what . 
r~arc Bloch saia we must not do, and that is to let 
our sophiscicdLion run in neutral gear. Blocn 
callea ir. a crlnle, a crime to treasu e methods and 5 
a l l o ~  e r u d ~ E ~ o n  co feed upon itself. Yet we were 
culpable. ~e flew after new iaeas while ignoring 
~ n e  reasons for choosing one idea over another or 
ror having ideas in the first place. The result: 
~nany nighly ~rofessional, idle and impotent pro- 
jeccs . 
No; long before his aeath, Alan blerriam and 
L chancea to caKe a trip together. (Sadness as 
well as joy always accompanies my retu- Ls to In- 
Jiana.) Merriam said what most dishear~ened him 
was co see the vast power of anthropology, his 
grand, hearcy discipline--the greatest discipline 
of the twentieth century, I believe--harnessed to 
clny, trivial tasks. 
The whole field of social science is littered 
and clotted with incricate and exacting studies 
of topics that do not matter. As a science, folk- 
lore has moved s~noocnly forward in recording pro- 
cedures, from reconstructed texts to ethnopoetic 
analysis, ana it has stumbled backward into scien- 
c~sclc professionalism. But our story is more con- 
fused, more encouraging. Ac exactly the moment 
dnen we were ~uost excited by what we called 
"theory," ana what Lee Benson suggests was largely 
Lnept mimicry of science, the key moral issue of 
folklore remained alive. It still kicked in the 
arguments over the definition of folklore. 
The ideas we discuss when defining our study 
do noc fit our sc~entific aspirations. We are em- 
barrassed that we continue to wrangle over our de- 
rinition when scholars in other aisciplines do not. 
We der~lean our own arguments by likening them to 
gar~les, or crivializing cnem as mere acactemic calis- 
thenics, treating them as though they had no bear- 
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1ng on life itself. Yet we continue in our intro- 
uuctory classes ana books to worry about the de- 
finicion, and when the "folk" idea connects with 
public opinion and the marketplace, as with folk- 
song in the sixties and f o l ~  art today, our urge 
to define becoll~es energeiic, even hot. That is 
good. It is wny I an, opti~ilistic about our dis- 
cipline. For in tne definiiion abides the moral 
Lore of folklore. 
Definitions can set liniits or they can high- 
light centers. Intelligently, we have never de- 
fined what uefinition meant, and while seeming to 
talk abouc ~ounaaries which when established would 
render one thlng folk and another not, our hearts 
have lay Itlore in the work of defining a center, 
of giving definition to an enduring idea. That 
idea tias always engendered argument and has never 
y~elaed any conclusions. And that is right. Ar- 
guments over the delinition of folklore are not 
L ~ k e  arguir~ents over the boiling point of water. 
No instrument can test their accuracy, no arti- 
ficial rules can silence them. Each generation 
~irust state the definition anew, debate it afresn, 
because folklore's definition is not factual and 
free of value. Its virtue is that it is c;larged 
witn values, saturated with opinions a b o u ~  how one 
ought to live in the world. 
After liseening to a long, spirited argument 
among the young stars of folklore, one of the great 
old folklorists, a man now dead, rose and left the 
rooin, saying to me as he passed ( I  was a graduate 
studen; at the time, chrilled to be standing si- 
lently at tne edge of such talk): "CJell, when chey 
finally define folklore , I ' ~ n  quitting. " He was 
correct because no one, no committee or government 
agency or scnolarly oligarchy, nas the right to 
decide finally what folklore is or how it should 
be studied. He was correct more because the con- 
cinuing, unstoppable argument over the definition 
has kept folklore's moral philosophy alive. When 
  he issue of tne definition ceases to be inter- 
escing, we should all quit. 
It is rrue tnat tne ideas in the definitional 
argument have been lamentably disconnected from 
our cornmon praccice. Hut they have not been aban- 
donea u~cerly, ana chat is the main reason why I 
ail] not as sad about folklore as Lee Benson is about 
history, even cnough I believe his model of decline 
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fits folklore well enough to sound the alarm in 
our shop too. 
Over a decade ago when I was teaching courses 
in theory here at Indiana, and when I thought of 
folklore as sopnisticaLed, a noted linguist at this 
university told me with a fatherly smile that folk- 
lorists were the hunters and gatherers of academe. 
de were a tribal people, still rooting about in 
reality, hunting down and gathering up facts that 
we brought back alive. In those days we remembered 
wnen folklore classes did not exist in most univer- 
slcies, ana we were delighted to be allowed to en- 
cer the university, set up camp, and practice our 
nu~nble, archaic trade. They had let us in and we 
honored the established disciplines around us by 
stealing all we could. While the more advanced 
people around us slept, we slid in the shadows past 
their fires. rifled their baggage, stole their 
~ooks, learned tneir language, and came to be able 
LO ape tneir culture in a way that we at least 
found convincing. In our excitement we did not 
stop to ponder whether their theories sorted well 
~ ~ l r h  our tradiclonal preoccupations. We learned 
ttle schemes of those we perceived to be higher in 
the academ~c hierarcny than ourselves, then applied 
;hose scnenles to our own topics. We felt mature. 
Uenign outsiders probably took our growth to be 
a sign of advancement from savagery to barbarism. 
but we were, l ~ u e  them, professional. 
I n  those aays of growth, the sixties, there 
was a aangerous drift toward abandoning the old 
argument over the definitio,i. Status as a pro- 
fessional d~scipline obviated the need to argue. 
For Inany, folklore became whatever professional 
fol~l0riSt cnose to study. Yet there was re- 
slstance to cnat false definition, and ac implicit 
concepc of folklore persisred. When foi~lorists 
,,let in public places--on governnient panels, for 
instance--tney founa that they agreed about what 
~ s s  folklore and what was not, whether or not they 
coula articulate a definition abstractly. A simple 
proof of the existence of a deep operating defini- 
cion Lies in the fact that of the simultaneous 
ruovements to incorporate material culture and popu- 
Lac culcure into folklore, one was successful, one 
was not. Material culture, as a topic of study, 
was swiftly, completely accepted as part of the 
alscipline, wnile popular culture never has been, 
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and that is because the definition of folklore 
shifcs at its borders but holds at its center. 
It is fortunate for us, and of great histori- 
cal importance for our discipline, that when 
theories exhilaraced us, when material culture was 
gaining acceptance, and many were abandoning the 
argument over the definition and replacing it with 
empty talk abouc professional standards, a major 
folklorist,, Dan Ben-Amos, remained concerned about 
the definition, and in the landmark volume, Toward 
New Perspectives in Folklore, he gave his genera- 
cion its definition. Not everything is folklore. 
Dan Ben-Amos said folkkore was artistic communi- 
cation in small groups. The particular arguments 
that Dan Ben-Amos mounted in behalf of his formu- 
lacion are historically interesting. They are part 
of the polemic of his article's period. Today his 
arguments are no longer compelling but his bril- 
liant definition continues to focus the thought 
of modern folklorists, precisely because it states 
in modern terms the key moral proposition of folk- 
lore's old tradition and because the words he chose 
nold great power in our commonplace language. 
Let me talk about the words he chose. "Ar- 
tistic" is the first word. It shares roots with 
artificial and artifact. Art consists of things 
made with artifice. Not so long ago in our civi- 
lization, the artist was an architectural deco- 
rator, a craftsman, like a carpenter, a weaver, 
a bookbinder. Art begins as that which is hand- 
made, not natural, but artificial, intended, 
crested. To us, art means that--and much more, 
for time has deposited layers of meaning over the 
original idea of the intentionally hand-made. By 
selecting "artistic" and not "art," Ben-Amos limi- 
iea the degree to wnich the common idea of art can 
ve built into the ~efinition of folklore. But even 
saying "artistic" we entail two other concepts. 
First is the idea of the aesthetic. The aesthetic 
exci-ces the senses. We use the word anesthetic 
casually in medicine to mean that which kills 
feeling. The aesthetic is the opposite. It en- 
livens feelings, exciting the senses. The idea 
a= the aesthetic cannot be reduced to pleasure. 
The senses can be unhappily, painfully excited. 
But if excited, they are involved, not disconnected 
and inert, but engaged actively. If folklore is 
artistic, then it is aesthetic. It compels the 
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involvement of its creators' feelings. Folklore 
1s not everything. It is, first of all, that which 
1s creaced by someone who is involved in--and con]- 
miteu to--its creation. Therefore, folklore stands 
against alienation, alienation of the kind that 
separates a worker from his product, a speaker from 
nis language. Saying that, we express one of our 
discipline's traditional values. Folklorists are 
appalled by alienation, by that which prevents 
people from preserving active control over their 
own creative energies. Asserting that folklore 
1s artistic is to say that folklore is hand-made 
(n~aue w ~ t h  the conrrol of its producers) and 
aesthecic (created out of the full sensual involve- 
~~ient of its creator). The folkloristic actor is 
gatnered wholeheartedly into the act of doing, lost 
in;o creativity. No one does something artistic 
instinctively or nonchalantly or by coercion. The 
artist aoes what the artist chooses to do. By be- 
ginning to think about the first word in our de- 
finition, we find ourselves having taken a strong 
stance against forces that alienate people from 
cheir right to create. And that is but a begin- 
ning, for art, to us, means more than hand-made 
anu aesthetic. Art is more than craft. It is al- 
ways crafc, but it is craft that embodies profundi- 
ty. The second idea that art inevitably raises- 
-seconu to the idea of the aesthetic, the involved- 
-is prorundity. Art expresses important ideas. 
lhougn we ofcen reduce profundity to intellection, 
to ph~losopny (just as we reduce the aesthetic to 
pleasure), profundity, as Kobert Plant Armstrong 
ile,,~onstr tes in his great trilogy on the affecting 7 presence , takes aany shapes. Art can expose phi- 
losophies, or power, or nameless moving essences. 
Art is maae w ~ t h  ~nvolvernent so as to expose pro- 
found forllls or feelings or ideas. Saying folklore 
is arciscic, then, is co take a stand against a- 
Lienacion and against triviality. Folklore is im- 
portani, not cheap, not shallow, but profound. 
The varlety of profundity .,lost moving to the folk- 
lorist is i~lrplied by the next words Dan Ben-Amos 
chose. 
The second word is "communication." It shares 
roocs with community ana communion. Communication 
means connection. Con~munication joins separately 
volitional eri;ities, logically linking intention 
wizh response. vJhen the com~i~unication is artistic, 
when it is folklore, it corrles of self involvement, 
but it is not intended to leave the self in iso- 
lation. Communication connects; it effects the 
connnections of community that unify people, and 
it effeces the connections of communion that bring 
people together while joining them to all that lies 
beyonu them. That is, just as folklore stands 
agains~ alienation and triviality, folklore stands 
against radical individualism, against solipsism. 
Artistic communication cannot be an autoerotic 
gesture or an attempt to mystery. It must be an 
intention to connect, a force that uses the self 
and the personal perception of profundity to make 
connections to that which exists beyond the pre- 
cious self. 
The third element in Dan Ben-Amos's definition 
1s "small group." The sri~all group is the immediate 
referent to the artistic self. Saying "small 
group" brings to mind anthropological and sociolo- 
gical ideas about how people interact in intense 
face-to-face situations. But size is not cne 
Issue,nor is the problem one of social organiza- 
irlon. Finally tne folklorist asks noc so II I U ~ L I  now 
people interact as why they interact. SJhat ii~airters 
1s the force that makes groups cohere. The impli- 
cation is that folklore engenders personally in- 
volvea connections alllong people who exist in on- 
going associations. To form ongoing associations, 
people agree to argue about deep ideas of right 
and wrong. They may differ in opinion, but they 
are oriented toward the same basic values. Values 
hold people together in groups. Their artistic 
communications work to bring those values into con- 
sciousness so that the members of the group, what- 
ever its size, acc for or against a shared sense 
of morality. Individuals are good or bad, but as ar- 
tiscic con~municators in ongoing associations, they 
do not exist beyond values, without morality. So 
fol~lore, as a discipline, not only stands against 
alienation, triviality, and solipsism, it stands 
against amorality. 
'lhis antagonistic position of the folklorist 
is written into our most recent, most active de- 
finition. I f  we return to Lee Benson's critique, 
bJe alscover in our definition an address to the 
very properzies that Benson narlies as essenLia1 to 
a 111oiaL philosopriy . Folklore, by definition, is 
a ioaccer of concern over selfriood. Folklore in- 
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volves 111y calents, my will, my feelings, my sense 
of the profound. At the same time, folklore, by 
definition, is a matter of concern over responsi- 
bility. My idea of the profound is shared and I 
use my talent to express it so- that moral connec- 
tions can be made. I use myself responsibly. 
Folklore is, precisely, a unification of selfhood 
and responsibility. By using words that connect- 
-"artistic ~omrr~unication ," not "art and communica- 
tion"--our definition does not propose that the 
self and the collective might coexist. It argues 
for their reciprocity, suggesting that they should 
exist interdependently. Creating folkloristically, 
the indiviaual elects to use personal power for 
coLlec;ive, moral ends. 
Our definition incorporates our traditional 
values (we cherish at once creativity and connec- 
tedness), ancl it should guide our research. The 
uniticatlon of Iny personal neeas witn my wish to 
Live welL alltong rrry fellows--this desire guider my 
perforlnance. Performance, by dint of the great 
genius of bell H y r n ~ ,  has become a word of vast 
significance for us. It is right thair perforrrlance 
srioulu doririr~aie our thinking ana guide our choice 
01 subJect. Creativity alone is not enough to n~a!ce 
perf or~~lance , nor can perf orri~ance arise purely f rorn 
connectivity. We are called by the convergence 
of the power to create with the will to con- 
nect. We snou1.d stddy the ways in which self, so- 
ciety, 3na values merge, erupting in action that 
is not alienated, not trivial, not solipsistic, 
not amoral. 
Speaking now I have no sense of being pres- 
sured ~y some superorganic agent or government po- 
licy or tyranny of the social scene into using the 
English language. I do not feel disengaged from 
the language. It seems, instead, to be part of 
me. When magnificent tradition, the product of 
centuries of development and the creation of mil- 
lions of people, gathers itself like a storm to 
break through my mouth, when I feel there is an 
idea within that must be shaped for presentation 
to those with whom I wish to be united, performance 
begins. Past and present, personal and collective 
fuse in performance. At certain moments, conven- 
tional dichotomies--individual versus society, self 
versus culture, action versus tradition--are ob- 
literated, falsified, and performance becomes the 
reality. English is my language. I use it to 
connect to you. When I sing the song I want to 
sing and which I think you want to hear, or which 
I think you should hear because of the predicament 
we share, performanc:e can happen. Folklore can 
exist. 
The moral core of folklore lives in the con- 
junction of the artistic with the social. That 
core is to be found in Dan Ben-Amos's definition 
and in Dell Hymes's prescription for study. Our 
idea is not that people should be artistic and that 
they should exist in communities. It is that 
simultaneously people should be able to fulfill 
themselves while contributing to the commonweal. 
Porces that prevent people from being able to do 
so, forces that coerce us to sacrifice our creati- 
vity for the common good or that assure us that 
our creativity need not be socially responsible 
--such forces can be condemned on the basis of 
folkloristic science. 
A part of the charm of the oral formulaic 
theory lay in its elimination of the oppositions 
of performer and audience, tradition and action. 
It helped bring us toward the idea that art, com- 
munication, and small groups could be gathered into 
a single act. And much of the power of Dan Ben- 
Amos's definition resides in the fact that it codi- 
fied the old values of our discipline in words 
appropriate to an era dominated, however subtly, 
by existential philosophy. 
If we review our history of definitions, we 
will find Ben-Amos's to be the modern statement of 
an old tradition that has shifted its terminology 
while preserving its focus upon connections between 
selfhood and responsibility. This moral philoso- 
phical concern is fundamentally romantic and the 
major changes in folklore's definition have come 
in response to changes within the overarching phi- 
losophy of romanticism which have been, in turn, 
responses to new readings of the human condition. 
Before there was a word folklore, there was 
a definition of folklore. I will call it Rous- 
seauian. In the eighteenth century, thinkers held 
che belief, the hope, that an individual could en- 
compass and speak the national soul. It should 
be possible for one person to absorb and then ex- 
press the heritage of his people, the will of the 
collective. In Scotland, that thought led to Mac- 
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pherson's forgeries and Kobert Burns's attempts to 
oe the national poet. He worried in correspondence 
over his claim to the inheritance of dead rebels 
ana whether it was appropriate for the national 
poet to be an exciseman, and he was told he should 
be a farmer. He was not much of a farmer, but it 
fit the role he was trying to fill. The first full 
edition of Burns' works, published to aid his wi- 
dow, does not begin with a biograpty but with an 
account of Scottish peasant culture. Imagine be- 
ginning a collected edition of Shakespeare with 
an essay on the Elizabethan bourgeiousie. Today 
when we present a great poet sprung of the soil 
we do not begin with the collective, ethnographi- 
cally, we begin with a marvelous individual, bio- 
graphically. The biographies of Patrick Kavanagh 
do not start with essays on indomitable Irish 
Geasantry. But in the period of the Rousseauian 
definition, it was right that a biography would 
commence in the national matrix, that a poet would 
become confused about whether a piece was his or 
theirs; Burns claimed the tradition for himself 
and also credited the tradition with his own works. 
lt is interesting for us to try to disentangle the 
artist from the art, but the truly interesting 
ching is that we can never be sure where Burns and 
his informants separate. The point is that in his 
day there was a theory (which he understood) that 
an exceptional individual could serve as a vehicle 
for the common spirit. 
 hat theory guided the first generation of se- 
rious folkloristic fieldworkers. In the early 
nineteenth century, T. Crofton Croker searched the 
Irish land for expressions of the Irish spirit, 
and in his first great book, published in 1824, 
he presented ancient architecture, archaic beliefs, 
and modern seditious street ballads. He followed 
quickly with his books of stories that expanded 
in their comparative scope through correspondence 
with the Grl+yms, and then published a book of popu- 
lar songs. His books of tales are rightfully 
cited crucial in the history of our disci- 
pline,19s but his book of songs has been neglected. 
That is because the stories had international re- 
lations and came from poor rural people, while the 
songs were largely local (an appropriate emphasis 
for Ireland) and many came from known, recent 
authors. Croker's stories and songs both fit the 
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definition of his age, but scholars in later times, 
operating with a different definition, could not 
feel that Croker's popular songs were really folk- 
song. Croker, for example, featured the poet 
Honest Dick Millikin, who died in 1815 (when 
Croker was seventeen) and who was an urban lawyer. 
But that seems strange only if we press late nine- 
teenth century assumptions about "the folk" back 
into the middle of the Rousseauian concept of folk- 
lore. For Croker, folklore could be architecture 
or gravestones, customs or fairy stories, and it 
was bound not by class but by national spirit. 
~t could be urban or rural, it could come from rich 
or poor. What mattered was that it incarnated the 
authentic tradition of Ireland. A lawyer writing 
alone in his study could embody the Irish tradition 
for an instant and express it in his verse. That 
idea is to be found in English language poetry from 
Milton to Whitman, and it persists in modern folk- 
life scholarship. It let Croker sweep wide in his 
interests, searching for works of art which, like 
the poems of Burns and the ancient tales of the 
peasants, bodied forth the collective spirit. 
A generation passed, folklore gained a name, 
problems changed and so did the definition of folk- 
lore. I will call this next definition Pre-Raphae- 
lite. Most of us were raised with the Pre-Raphae- 
lite definition. It developed early in the era 
we inhabit, in the middle of the nineteenth cen- 
tury, and its proposition is that folklore exists 
in opposition to industrializing modernization. 
If industrializing modernization is a product of 
the capitalistic bourgeoisie, then folklore is the 
product of a precapitalistic peasantry. If in- 
dustrializing modernization is a matter of social 
and conceptual fragmentation, formal education, 
professionalism, and materialism, then folklore 
depends on social and conceptual integration, on 
informal education, amateur action, and spritiual 
values. If industrializing modernization brings 
the nation-state, then folklore crosses political 
boundariesand thrives in communities, in localities 
and regions, among ethnic and religious groups, 
in families. In Pre-Raphaelite terms, folklore 
became a negative projection of a critique of mo- 
dernity. The worst features of modern life were 
codified, their reverse was imagined, and that was 
folklore. If modernity brings exploitation through 
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allenation, cheapness through triviality, moral 
failure through radical individualism, desperation 
ihrough the destruction of small-group orientation, 
tnen folklore fights back. If modernity brings 
standardization, mass production, then folklore 
results from nonstandardization, from variation. 
If modernity means constantly changing fashions, 
folklore means stable traditions. The purpose of 
fashion is to create class disjunction; the pur- 
pose of folklore is egalitarian integration of the 
little community. 
That kind of forceful critical thinking 
softened during the twentieth century, but its 
legacy survived in the definitions that still domi- 
nated the discipline when Dan Ben-Amos and I were 
in graduate school. Its critical virtues were not 
eliminated when folklore was redefined as artistic 
communication in small groups. In the worst in- 
dustrial situations, workers do not control the 
design, construction, and use of their products. 
They do not do what they want to do. Their pro- 
ducts are not art. The leaders of the nation- 
state strive to replace allegiance to small groups 
with ideological alignments that undermine our 
capacity to communicate with our peers. In iso- 
lation, we have no small groups to give our art 
to. As definitions changed, folklore's core con- 
cerns held firm. Are people in the modern world 
able to achieve creative engagement, responsible 
selfhood? Our study answers in the affirmative. 
The words of the definition changed. Its core 
remained stable. But the perspective demanded by 
the definition did change. The Pre-Raphaelite 
perspective was external. It adopted the position 
of the archivist or the visitor to a museum. Its 
intent was to describe patterns in products. The 
new definition requested an internal perspective, 
a view from the angle of the actor. It centers 
witnin a creator who is operating volitionally 
among conditions beyond control. It is an exis- 
tential definition -- and I remind you that exis- 
~entialism is twentieth century romanticism -- 
and so it fits the times that we occupy. 
From the Rousseauian through the Pre-Rapha- 
elite to the existential, folklore's definitions 
have preserved a concern with the relationship 
between personal creativity and collective values. 
13 7 
During the most recent definitional change history 
was deemphasized and action was emphasized (as 
seemed appropriate for an existential formulation), 
~ u t  no change was made in the idea of folklore as 
a phenomenon. The change lay in the location of 
perception. The Pre-Raphaelite definition de- 
scribed patterns exhibited by objects. Basically 
it held that the objects worthy of the name folklore 
display a pair of apparently contradictory traits: 
folklore is more variable than mass produced ob- 
jects, and yet more stable than fashion. First, 
folklore varies. It is not standardized, rather 
it varies with time and space, adjusting itself 
to conditions. Finally, variation is the record 
of the Lndividual creator of the object being so 
involved in the act of creation that when the ob- 
ject appears in the world it carries some impress 
of its creator's being, and so differs from things 
made by other people. At the same time, folklore 
is traditional. It preserves patterns of conti- 
nuity despite the disruptive forces of history. 
Tradition is the result of the use of the shared 
past by an individual in order to communicate, in 
order to make connections in the present. Communi- 
cation requires tradition; tradition requires com- 
nunication. From an external point of view, folk- 
lore is the sum of products that simultaneously 
display variation and tradition, uniqueness and 
continuity. If we relocate ourselves so we stand 
with the creator, in his or her world, then we find 
that variation is a way to describe the result of 
an involved, artistic act, and that tradition is a 
way to describe the restraint, the acceptance of 
convention that is necessary to effect communica- 
cions with other members of an ongoing social as- 
sembly. To be artistic, creativity must be free, 
variable. To be communicative, creativity must be 
restrained; it must be channeled through conven- 
tions; it must utilize the past to build the future; 
it must be traditional. The fusion of variation 
and tradition, of freedom and restraint--of self- 
hood and responsibility--is what we call folklore 
and what we study as performance. 
Simply, folklore is the way that one answers 
at once the needs of the self and the needs of the 
collective. If the needs of the self demand so- 
lipsistic or antisocial formation, then we may have 
art, but we do not have folklore. If the needs 
of the collective demand a suspension of self rea- 
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lization, then we may have nobility but we do not 
have folklore. Folklore happens when the indivi- 
dual willingly takens control of the collective 
destiny. In focusing upon such moments, folklorists 
approve of such acts; they make judgements and take 
political positions. Standing in favor of self 
realization through creativity, folklore stands 
against alienation and exploitation, against sla- 
very, demeaning labor, and hypocritical dogma, in 
favor of freedom. While favoring freedom, folklore 
stands against excessive individualism, in favor 
of mature restraint, communication, responsibility. 
kt once folklore opposes the worst aspects of mo- 
dern labor and modern art. 
What is the future of folklore? If folklore 
rises out of the successful coordination of perso- 
nal needs with collective needs, it would seem to 
nave little future. A grim reading of an age shot 
tnrough with selfishness ana cowardice, with false 
ideologies and wage slavery, would lead us to be- 
lieve our job is obsolescent. And if we sit back, 
comfortably stewing in our own pessimism, believing 
the lies perpetrated by those who call themselves 
our leaders, then our jobs should be eliminated. 
But I believe our work to be crucially important, 
so I will place myself within the old folkloristic 
tradition of critique and prescribe action for the 
future in a friendly manifesto. 
First, we must continue to argue over the na- 
ture of folklore and the definition of our disci- 
pline, avoiding the complacent attitudes that have 
enervated more established disciplines. Folklore 
is not simply what professional folklorists choose 
to study, nor is it enough to do one's private work 
efficiently. As we argue over what folklore is, 
we preserve the intrinsic value structure that has 
nurtured our discipline for a long time. We must 
Learn to shrug off accusations of irrationality 
when we criticize vicious superstitions that parade 
in the clothing of science. We must learn not to 
mind being called sentimental and romantic by those 
who hate and fear the people we celebrate. We must 
nold to the old values. But we need not agree. 
Agreemeni would not be useful. We should remain 
passionate about the central issues of the disci- 
pline. They are probably the central moral fea- 
tures of human existence. They deserve heated dis- 
agreement. 
Second, we should resist attempts to separate 
our study from our daily lives. When study is con- 
tained wholly by academic tradition, it decays ra- 
pidly into professionalism. Precisely through en- 
gaging with the world and worrying about the common 
experiences we have, we will keep our discipline 
fresh and our studies useful to ourselves and our 
small group. Our arguments about artistic communi- 
cation should be, themselves, artistic communica- 
tions that raise for us profound problems. As we 
strive to maintain connections between study and 
action, between personal and collective needs, 
there will be three major fronts on which we will 
fight for the future of folklore. 
Understanding the idea of responsible self- 
hood, it becomes our task to keep it alive in the 
world. We will do this in our own work, making 
sure that our scholarship meets our own standards, 
that it never becomes alienated and unartful, un- 
communicative, unproductive, and irresponsible. 
And we must help others do the same. Like us, they 
should be allowed to do good work. That means 
folklorists should be involved in revivals, in ma- 
king decisions concerning excellence, in struggling 
to keep excellence with us. I will not be ab- 
stract. Let me offer an example, a model: Ralph 
KinzLer. He helped to preserve the Ingtown Pottery 
wnen it was imperiled. Today at Ingtown Vernon 
Owens is master. tie is heir to a tradition that 
stretches back to the eighteenth century in the 
North Carolina Piedmont and beyond to Stafford- 
shire. It is one of the world's great ceramic tra- 
ditions and within it Vernon Owens is a consummate 
artist, deft, sensitive, brave, and serious. Were 
it not for the folklorist Ralph Rinzler and his 
associates, it would be difficult, perhaps impos- 
sible, for Owens to do the work he wants to do, 
practicing his trade, enhancing his skills, offer- 
ing his handsome products to the world. Ralph Rin- 
zler did not attempt to revive the Carolina tradi- 
tion falsely by becoming a potter himself. Instead 
he worked so that Vernon Owens could work. That 
is good work for a folklorist. At the Smithsonian, 
Ralph Rinzler helped set up good new markets for 
traditional workers, and that too was proper folk- 
loristic enterprise. Rinzler appreciated Cajun 
music. He did not buy a fiddle. Instead he used 
money from the Newport Folk Festival to build 
support for Cajun music within Louisiana, helpfng 
Dewey Balfa become the great force he remains in 
the performance of his own music and in the stimu- 
Lation12 of musical traditions throughout the 
South. Folklorists should work against the pro- 
fiteers by getting money to people who wish to keep 
their own arts alive. 
One front which we fight for folklore is revi- 
val, and Ralph Kinzler has shown that we can be 
victorious. There is no reason why you should not 
try your hand at potting or Cajun fiddling. (Ralph 
Kinzler is a superb musician himself.) Such at- 
tempts can increase your capacity for empathy. 
But finally they are unimportant. What matters 
is finding people who have the urge to communicate 
artistically, to create traditionally, and suppor- 
ting them so they can continue. 
A second front on which the future will be 
contested lies within the government. The lamenta- 
ble record of governments in handling folklore is 
not sufficient reason for pretending governments 
do not exist. It is true that when governments 
appropriate folklore, art is lowered into propa- 
ganda. One government uses folklore to support 
the regime by appeals to homogeneity. Another 
elects to authenticate itself by displays of plu- 
ralism. Either way folklore is distorted. When 
governments give support to folklore (just as when 
they offer support to scholarhip), dependencies 
develop, subtle shifts occur, and ultimately folk- 
lore's (or scholarship's) power is destroyed. The 
democratic spirit is confused when government offi- 
cials believe that they ought to help the folk. 
The folk--Lo parody Pogo--is us, and we don't need 
no nelp fro1ll no government. But we do not need 
our government to harm us either, so we do need 
help within the government. We need civil servants 
willing to work to undermine the power of the go- 
vernment so that life can unfold without its dis- 
ruptions. 
Primarily as a result of the work of Archie 
Green, we now have in many state governments and 
within the federal government people on our side. 
Not all of the activities of the Folklife Center 
in Washington seem proper to me, but Alan Jabbour 
is doing good folkloristic work when he attempts 
to influence other government agencies so that they 
will be more circl-mspect, more respectful in their 
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in their approach to folk cultures. We have little 
need for photographs of quaint weatherbeaten 
gentlemen from our government, little need for 
brief colorful quotations, but we do need people 
in government who are sophisticated about its na- 
cure, wno have the courage to confront its evil 
and sabotage its plans. The essential domestic 
purpose of our government is to support an economic 
system that is dedicated to the destruction of the 
human right to perform. Your government wants you 
to surrender creativity, to buy costly ephemeral 
junk, and to accept bodily comfort as an end in 
itself. You should not wish to perpetuate small 
groups. Your government wishes you to exist in 
mute isolation, vulnerable to ideological mani- 
pulation. Simply, then, folklorists who believe 
that everyone has the right to be creative and to 
exist in small groups in accord with their own 
values--folklorists are obliged to resist the go- 
vernment's intentions. 
At this moment, Alan Jabboy5 is working on 
the Cultural Conservation Report. Historic pre- 
servation legislation protects important buildings. 
Perhaps legislation canbe devised that will protect 
important cultures. No longer would the Army Corps 
of Engineers be allowed to seize farmland, banish 
its inhabitants, and destroy their community, in 
order to turn their home earth into parks for tou- 
rists. We need neatly attired, politically savvy 
wobblies who can speak the bizarre language of 
Washington, in which nouns become verbs or letters, 
who can communicate artfully in that small group 
on behalf of folklore. We need allies in govern- 
ment who can slow the government down. 
I have isolated two of the fronts on which 
the baitle fox folklore will be fought and named 
two men who are already successfully in action. 
The third front, and the one I consider most impor- 
tant ( I  would be a hypocrite if I did not believe 
it to be most important since it is the one I have 
chosen) is scholarly. Here I see our opportunity 
dividing to provide us with a pair of ways to act 
in order to bring our lives and thoughts into one- 
ness in the service of folklore. 
As we orieni our energies beyond our community 
of scholars, it is our responsibility Co learn to 
connect to the needs of the people we study. It 
is that simple: we must learn to become interested 
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in what the people who interest us are interested 
in. First of all, that would be scientific. The 
emic impulse lies at the very center of our 
existentially redefined discipline, and our science 
would be carried to its proper conclusion if we 
learned to communicate artistically about the 
things that the people we study artistically com- 
n~unicate, striving to become concerned about the 
matters that concern them. Remember, we do not 
study stones, we study people and they can tell 
us what is important to them. Our task is being 
patient. Lady Gregory said that a l~lklorist's 
virtues are patience and reverence. Reverence 
comes from patience. Moving slowly, you learn 
their interests, you come to share their orienta- 
tion, their understanding. Their texts take on 
meaning. Science is served. Lady Gregory was in- 
terested in language. She waited and was led from 
now people talked to what they said, toward why 
tney said it. She shifted with them from words 
to fairy stories to legends and ballads to values. 
That is the natural style of the scientific ethno- 
grapher: to follow innocently, learning new and 
deeper things. 
If our science reorients itself to align with 
the thinking of the people we study, one alteration 
in emphasis will be necessary. Within our little 
community, the scholar most valued is the one who 
displays analytic skills while connecting inter- 
estingly to our own tradition of concern. But if 
we wish to serve the people we study, we will find 
they have little need tor our analysis. 'Tf it: is 
righc, they probably already know ics essence. The 
calent we do have that can be of use ta them is 
that of collecting and presenting texts. Thsy are 
working hard to preserve texts, and we are capable 
of helping them do it. Kecently I composed two 
tellings of one tale concernin life in a small 
community in Northern Ireland .If For my community, 
I wrote Passing the Time in Ballymenone, full of 
arLqlysis and digressions that I hoped would be use- 
fiil to my colleagues. I made sure that Passing 
the Time, like my other books on Ireland, would 
have an Irish publisher and so be available to 
Irish people, but for the people of Ballymenone 
I wrote Irish Folk History, consisting entirely 
of texts. Lacking deep analysis, lightly anno- 
tated, ic is not a book to please the professional, 
but it pleased my friends in Ballymenone. They feel 
honored by the big book, I am glad it has gotten 
wonderful reviews in the local papers, but the book 
Ballymenone likes is the small one, which I sent 
to every household in the community. More than the 
books' royalties (which, of course, I give to my 
major "informants"), the small book is my repayment 
for their help. Irish Folk History is a set of 
texts to which people can bring their own contexts, 
their own interpretations, which they can enliven 
with their own analysis so as to teach themselves 
about themselves. Michael Boyle, James Owens, Joe 
Flanagan, Ellen Cutler, wonderful old Hugh Nolan- 
-most of those who contributed to my work are dead 
now. But Ballymenone has their texts, pure on the 
page. Those texKS are what they want. They con- 
struct their own culture. They do not need us to 
formulate it for them. But old people die, old wis- 
dom vanishes, and we can help future generations 
by preserving the texts they must interpret as part 
of tneir own quest for maturity. 
Folklorists must learn enough about the people 
they study to be able to make useful gifts to them. 
Laudably, the Folklore Institute has responded to 
the needs of the people of Indiana. Linda D6gh has 
led in the collection of Indiana tales and their 
preservation in Indiana Folklore. Warren Roberts 
tlas led in the collection of Indiana's material 
culture and its preservation in a museum where the 
people of the state will be able to see it forever. 
Currently, Indiana University is sponsoring 
an important oral history project. One good use 
of our expensive training would be to cooperate 
in such endeavors. Historical understanding is cru- 
cial to modern people. From history they learn nat- 
urally and emotionally about causes and systems, 
but the history that teaches them must bear upon 
Cheir lives, must in some measure be gathered from 
them. Oral history is one technique for engaging 
people in the historical process, for increasing 
their understanding of their conditions and their 
potential for overcoming conditions. The common 
people, people like us, must gain presence in the 
world of historical writing, so oral historical 
study calls the folklorist. It is the kind of work 
we are good at, and it is the kind of work the 
people want us to do. No problems of rapport or 
research design will arise. We should go to the 
people, describe our skills, and ask what they want 
us to do. Often their request will form as oral 
history. Here at Indiana I once taught the Afro- 
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American folklore course (now fortunately in the 
capable hands of Bill Wiggins). I talked about 
field research with leaders of Bloomingtonls Black 
community, and then organized the class to cooper- 
ate in producing an oral history of the Second 
Baptist Church, a central institution in the commu- 
nity, which we edited, typed, duplicated, and pre- 
sented to the Church on the occasion of its centen- 
nial. The folklorists did fieldwork and learned 
about Afro-American culture. The community received 
a document that it wanted. Everyone benefited. 
As scholars we have a scientific obligation 
to discover what the people are interested in, and 
then we have a social obligation to work with them 
to preserve that which they wish to see preserved. 
One of our scholarly obligations requires ori- 
encation to communities beyond our own. We must 
talk usefully about life. Another obligation di- 
rects us to engagement within our own academic corn- 
munity. We must know its traditions and honor them 
chrough arguing with them and guiding them by form- 
ing our observations and explanations so that they 
will lead to collective intellectual advancement. 
That demands care and rigor and seriousness. It 
also demands that we avoid becoming so comfortable 
in our little corner of the academy, so wrapped 
up in our own tiny tradition that our language and 
formulations cease to be generally accessible, Frn- 
n~ediately compelling, and widely interesting. 
Have you ever noticed how differently faculty 
members talk in faculty meetings than they talk 
in scholarly articles? In meetings or at par- 
ties--in locations where they really want to commu- 
nicate--scholars talk like the people folklorists 
study. They tell stories, they strive for artful 
shapings of deep ideas, they favor the particular 
over the abstract. Abstractions mystify. One speaks 
of economics, for example, in order to hide the 
real issues. No one has ever seen an economy, 
touched one, heard one. All we have experienced 
are manifestations of actions that we name econo- 
mic. The idea of economics is a matter of faith, 
a matter of piling metaphor on abstraction on meta- 
phor on abstraction. We could begin to cut through 
the nonsense by asking simple direct questions: 
"Do you like your work?" "Who benefits most from 
this exchange?" To ask,I1How does the economic sys- 
tern function?", is to leave scores of strange as- 
sumptions and conventions peculiar to our own cul- 
ture unexamined, unquestioned, and intact. Ourques- 
tions should get to the point, and our conclusions 
should be framed in language that allows people 
from outside our discipline to test them against 
their own traditions and experiences. Our scholar- 
ship should be communicative. It should enable con- 
nections to be made between our discipline and 
other disciplines, between academic and nonacademic 
communities. 
No discipline has the potential that folklore 
does for dismantling the barriers that have risen 
between the university and other communities. We 
study the daily lives of people, their commonplace 
speech and work, their artistic and ethical aspira- 
cions. Me would be false to our study, inept in its 
performance, if we did not learn from them and re- 
organize our lives in accordance with our study so 
as to make our own community more concerned with 
effecting social connections through artistic com- 
munications. Folklore is poised perfectly to make 
connections. 
In collusion with the people we study, we, 
the meek, the hunters and gatherers, could gain 
the power to save the academy from its rush toward 
professionalistic irrelevance. If the people need 
Local history, then we will provide it through oral 
nistory and artifactual analysis. If they want 
texts and old artifacts saved so that they will 
be able to examine themselves in the mirror of 
their own creations, then we will record and tran- 
scribe and help in the expansion of archives and 
museums. They will learn what we are trying to do, 
and as fieldworkers we will learn their needs, so 
that when they come to us in the university, we 
will be able to teach them things that we know they 
do not know but which we believe they must know 
in order to achieve their goals. We will follow 
when we can, lead when we must, and at the end of 
all, perhaps, the university will become once again 
a force in civic life of the nation. 
At once we will be concerned with other commu- 
nities and worried about our own. If we develop 
proper atrritudes toward the people we study, and 
then tyranize over our secretaries or bully our 
students, limiting their potential for artistic 
communication, then we have not grasped the heart 
of folklore's message. 
Within the academy, our task is to affirm the 
nonacaue~nic. de celebrate that which by convention- 
a1 definitions lies beyond academic scrutiny. Tak- 
ing oral history seriously, believing folk art is 
f ~ n e  art, knowing poor people can be brilliant, 
we engage in an endless--and endlessly fruit- 
ful--dialogue with our colleagues about what is 
good and how life should be conducted. In accept- 
ing the role of defenders of the nonacademic within 
che confines of the academy, we act correctly as 
folklorists and we move toward becoming true schol- 
ars. 
Jean-Paul Sartre has taught us what a scholar 
is not.16 A scholar is not a technician disengaged 
from the real world, lost in pursuits constricted 
by academic tradition. Keality calls. 
Reflexivity is essential to the scholar. We 
cannot be scientific ii we eliminate the observer, 
writing ourselves out of our own texts as though 
reality did not include us. But if reflexivity so 
coils upon itself that our texts display ourselves, 
rather than using ourselves as witnesses to real- 
ity, then the scholar's potential for changing the 
world for the better is lost. 
Theory is essential to the scholar. We must 
formulate generalizations and explanations in such 
a way that they will be of use to many others. But 
if what we call theories become mere conglomera- 
tions of bibliographic reference, or abstractions 
divorced from real situations, then they serve to 
obscure rather than to illuminate the world. When 
our theories are made of vapor and stated in dense 
jargon, then, it seems, their purpose is to gain 
us a livelihood while covering a form of exploita- 
tion in which we use other people for our own ends. 
Nnen the "informant" becomes one who makes a prod- 
uct (or "carries" a culture) that only the folklor- 
ist knows how to use and process properly, when 
elaborate theories serve to separate the creator 
of folklore from its significance, then informants 
become folklore's lower class; folklorists use in- 
formants like rich people use poor q~jople, like 
E.Said has said the West uses the East. Westerners 
have taken the products of the East, the beautiful 
carpecs and delicious spices, then they have used 
Near Eastern people as exotic objects to manipulate 
in art, literature, and science. White Americans 
nave consumed Afro-American music and use Black 
people as things to depict and study. Folklorists 
have similarly used "the folk" and they have used 
theories to hide the fact by arguing that it is 
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the folklorist, not the person who creates the 
folklore, who understands and can explain its mean- 
ing. Using others for our pleasure and benefit is 
indecent. Lofty abstractions and layers of impene- 
trable jargon often function to obscure that inde- 
cency while providing money to academics and pre- 
venting them from becoming true scholars. 
To be scholars we must recognize, first of 
all, that reality is not divided in the way that 
the academy is. No single discipline can compass 
reality's complexities, so all seekers for truth 
must move beyond the discipline that trained them 
ana provided them with a good point of entry. Ulti- 
mately every scholar becomes an amateur. Declaring 
that you are a historian, meeting a fact, determin- 
ing that it is sociological, and then saying,"Well, 
I'll leave that to the sociologists," is tantamount 
to saying,I1Truth does not interest me. My goal is 
in the preservation of academic distinctions." Sep- 
arate disciplines may be necessary to budgetary 
officers, and even to the ongoing dialectic energy 
of university life, but they cannot be allowed to 
inhibit individual scholars during their struggles 
for understanding. 
As truth (and not disciplinary traditions) 
must remain foremost in the scholar's mind, so re- 
ality must precede the self. It is not that we 
should forget our training or abandon our personal 
concerns, but we most learn to suspend our own tra- 
ditions so that we can go where the facts take us. 
In the social sciences, passive and inductive pro- 
cedures are not mystical or absurd. Our goal is 
understanding human beings, and human beings are 
conscious; they can get us on the right track, con- 
sulting with us as our work proceeds, helping to 
evaluate our conclusions. All we need is mastery 
of the language of daily discourse, a sense of 
immanent meaning, patience and reverence. 
The scholarly folklorists who forge the future 
will wish to engage with reality. They will cease 
writing prolegomena that outline exactingly in un- 
readible language what we might do if we ever got 
around to doing it. They will do their work and 
speak forcefully about it, teaching by example 
rather than by abstract prescription. They will 
no longer arbitrarily bracket and ignore aspects 
of reality, such as time. Eventually, they will 
surrender the strange convenience of synchrony, 
letting history rush into their studies, providing 
them with a way to explain as well as describe what 
is happening. 
Professionalism killed philosophy. There is 
no more philosophy, Sartre tells us, only students 
of the history of philosophy and groups of people 
wno enjoy assembling intricate puzzles without ref- 
erences to reality. Anthropology has taken philoso- 
pny's place, for anthropologists continue to ques- 
tion Western thinking against the whole of the 
world's complexity. And yet, not so long ago, James 
Deetz, an important anthropologist addressing his 
colleagues at the University of Pennsylvania, said 
cnat folklore had stolen the heart of anthropology. 
tie meant (in our terms) that anthropologists had 
become absorbed in professional problems, they had 
left moral philosophy behind and come to rest with- 
in the frame of Lee Benson's critique, while folk- 
lorists continued to bumble about in the field, 
attempting to understand people. We humble folk- 
lorists still go into the world enflamed by the 
moral perplex at the core of our definition. We 
still grapple with reality to try to improve our 
thinking. 
The future of the folklore scholar is to be 
a brave amateur, a realistic philosopher who be- 
lieves in the scientific investigation of the moral 
issue of cultural construction, who studies how 
self and society interpenetrate in performance. 
As scholarly folklorists we must work to save 
the university. We must talk directly about what 
we feel our colleagues and fellow citizens need 
to hear. We must affirm the study of artistic com- 
munication in small groups as both a scientific 
investigation and a moral philosophy that teaches 
people that they can be at once creative and use- 
ful. At last, we must take our own message to heart 
and in our work strive to be both artistic and 
socially responsible. 
NOTES 
1. This piece of writing is a version of a largely extem- 
porized talk delivered at Indiana University in the series 
"The Future of American Folklore," in February 1982. I am 
grateful to Linda ~ C g h  and her collegues, my friends, for 
the invitation and to Thomas Walker and Jeanne Harrah-Con- 
forth for providing me with a transcript of the talk which 
I edited to make it a bit more readable. 
2. I was deeply moved by a presentation that Lee Benson 
made to a faculty seminar at the University of Pennsylvania, 
on December 15, 1981. The participants in the seminar to 
Assess the Social Sciences received from Benson two papers: 
"Doing History as Moral Philosophy and Public Advocacy: A 
Practical Strategy to Lessen the Crisis in American History," 
originally presented to the organization of American Histo- 
rians, April 1, 1981; "Changing Social Science to change the 
World: A Discussion Paper," originally presented to the So- 
cial Science History Association, October 21, 1977, and sub- 
sequently printed in Social Science History. 
3. There are different schools of "ethnopoetic" analysis. 
Dennis Tedlock made a major contribution to folklore scholar- 
ship by breaking texts into lines in accordance with pauses 
and using typography to suggest loudness. Dell Hymes has 
furthered that idea in a style of transcription that reveals 
the poetic structures that enhance the work's significance. 
The thinking of both of these men inspires me as I perform 
the exciting task of transcribing texts from tapes. Key 
statements of their separate rationales are: Dennis Tedlock, 
"On the Translation of Style in Oral Narrative," in Am6rico 
Paredes and Richard Bauman, eds., Toward New Perspectives 
in Folklore (Austin: University of Texas Press for the Ameri- 
can Folklore Society, 1972), pp. 114-133; Dell Hymes, "Disco- 
vering Oral Performance and Measured Verse in American Indian 
Narrative," New Literary History 8 (1976/77):431-457. 
4. In the midst of a long contextual analysis of histori- 
cal narrative, I digress explicitly on the nature of context 
in Passing the Time in Ballymenon (see note 15, below), pp. 
33, 520-522. 
5. Marc Bloch (Peter Putnam, trans.), The Historian's 
Craft (New York: Random House, 1953), p. 86. 
6. Dan Ben-Amos' essay "Toward a Definition of Folklore 
in Context," first published in the Journal of American Folk- 
lore in 1971, led the Paredes and Bauman volume (see note 
3 above), pp. 3-15. It has been reprinted along with other 
of his important essays in this handy compilation: Dan Ben- 
Amos, Folklore in Context: Essays (New Delhi: South Asian 
Publishers [1982]), pp. 2-19. 
7. Robert Plant Armstron has worked admirably and serious- 
ly to free aesthetic philosophy of its West European "high 
art" bias, and in doing so has contributed magnificently to 
folklore. His major works: The Affecting Presence: An Essay 
in Humanistic Anthropology (Urbana: University of Illinois 
Press, 1971); Wellspring: On the Myth and Source of Culture 
(Berkeley, University of California Press, 1975); The Powers 
of Presence: Consciousness, Myth, and Affecting Presence 
(Philadelphia: University of PennsyLvania Press, 1981). 
8. The basic text is Dell Hymes, Foundationsin Sociolin- 
guistics: An Ethnographic Approach (Philadelphia: University 
of Pennsylvania Press, 1974). Many of his earlier papers 
listed in his bibliography remain crucial. Of particular 
use to folklorists is Hymes' essay, "Breakthrough into Per- 
formance," Dan Ben-Amos and Kenneth S. Goldstein, eds., Folk- 
lore Performance and Communication (The Hague: Mouton, 1975), 
pp. 11-74. 
9. I refer to J. Currie, ed., The Works of Robert Burns, 
Ir vols. (London: Cadell, Davies, and Creech, 1801) and to 
the correspondence reprinted in William Wallace, ed., Robert 
Burns and Mrs. Dunlop, 2 vols. (New York: Dodd, Mead, 1898). 
On Burns as both poet and informant, Mary Ellen B. Lewis 
writes interestingly in "Some Uses of the Past: The Tradi- 
tional Song Repertoire of Robert Burns," in Linda ~ C g h ,  Henry 
Glassie, and Felix J. Oinas, eds., Folklore Today: A Fest- 
schrift for Richard M. Dorson (Bloomington: Indiana Univer- 
sity Press, 1976), pp. 325-333. 
10. T. Crofton Croker's main works: Researches in the South 
of Ireland, Illustrative of the Scenery, Architectural Re- 
mains, and the Manners and Superstitions of the Peasantry 
(London: John Murray, 1824); different editions of Fairy 
Legends and Traditions of the South of Ireland (first series 
1825, second series 1828); and The Popular Songs of Ireland 
(London: Henry Colburn, 1839). 
11. On Croker, see Richard M. Dorson, The British Folk- 
lorists: A History (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 
19681, pp. 44-52. 
12. A primary document concerning the good work of the New- 
port Folk Foundation, from the days when it seemed right to 
spread the wealth and support authentic diversity, can be 
found in "Secretary's Report," in Henry Glassie and Ralph 
Rinzler, eds., Newport Folk Festival [program book] (New 
York: Newport Folk Foundation, 1967),pp. 6 ,  41-42, 44. 
13. Ormond Loomis submitted the final draft of the report, 
Cultural Conservation: The Protection of Cultural Heritage 
in the United States, to the National Park Service and the 
American Folklife Center on July 15, 1982. It is 95 pages 
long and provides much useful reading for folklorists. 
14. Lady Gregory's apt characterization of the qualities 
necessary to the folklorist come in her truly great folklore 
book, Visions and Beliefs in the West of Ireland (New York: 
Oxford University Press, 1970, first published 19201, p. 15. 
15. Henry Glassie, Passing the Time in Ballymenon: Culture 
and History of an Irish Community (Philadelphia: University 
of Pennsylvania Press, Dublin: O'Brien Press, 1982); Irish 
Folk History: Texts from the North (Philadelphia: University 
of Pennsylvania Press; Dublin: O'Brien Press, 1982). My 
earlier book on the same community: All Silver and No Brass: 
An Irish Christmas Mumming (Bloomington: Indiana Unversity 
Press; Dublin: Dolmen Press, 1976; paperback edition: Phila- 
delphia: University of Pennsylvania Press; Dingle: Brandon 
Books, 1983). 
16. Here and later I refer to Jean-Paul Sartre (John 
Matthews, trans.) Between Existentialism and Marxism (New 
York: William Morrow, 1976), and especially the essay "A Plea 
for Intellectuals." 
17. Edward W. Said, Orientalism (New York: Vintage Books, 
1979). 
